Finally, the time period on which the Committee focused in its policy deliberations was often too short. When the Committee set its targets for intermediate variables for only a month or two ahead, it was dealing with a period in which current operations could not have much effect, and it was not taking into account the longer-run implications of its decisions. (FOMC Minutes, February 14, 1972, 5) ."
Maisel's view received little support from most other members and opposition from the New York bank. President Hayes asserted: "It had not been demonstrated that total or nonborrowed reserves had any strong or direct effects on the ultimate goals of the economy," (ibid., 21). His statement seems to deny any link between money and economic activity and prices, a strange position for a central banker.
Later, the FOMC set a target for some measure of reserves or money growth, but it did not permit interest rates to change enough to achieve the target. I am puzzled by these reported failures to achieve a specified target for the aggregates. The members eventually recognized that their decision to limit interest rates changes caused inflation. Yet, they kept repeating that they would not permit more interest rate variability. Their decision protected the money market from variability at the cost of failing to protect the public from inflation. Eventually, the Volcker FOMC stopped short-term interest rate control and claimed that non-borrowed reserves was the target. To avoid blame for the increase in interest rates, the market gained more freedom to change short-term interest rates. At the time, no one believed that rate would rise to 20 percent.
The staff usually explained failure to control reserves by claiming that the demand for money shifted. It never admitted that its interest rate target was inconsistent with its reserve target. When challenged occasionally by FOMC members, the staff could not support its explanation.
A repeated theme claims that the demand for money and monetary velocity are unstable.
The only truth to this claim comes from over-reliance on quarterly data and concentration on the immediate or near-term while ignoring longer-term effects. Chart 1 plots monetary base velocity (using the Andersen-Rasche St. Louis base) against the corporate bond rate for 78 annual observations from 1919 to 1987. The plot looks the way monetary theory says it should. There is little evidence of the alleged instability that is commonly made by members and staff.
Chart 1 here I highlighted the years 1925 to 1928 and 1961 to 1969 to illustrate strong evidence of stability; when bond rates returned in the 1960s to the same range as in the 1920s, velocity returned to that range also. And after base velocity rose to new heights in the Great Inflation, shown by the points at the far right, it returned along the same path during the disinflation. At annual values, the chart shows considerable stability, not the instability claimed repeatedly by the Federal Reserve. The main exception is some years of the Great Depression at the far left of the charts. I conclude base money velocity is a neglected indicator of medium-term policy influence and public decisions.
Why are my findings about money and velocity so different from Federal Reserve staff claims? The principal reason is that their short-term focus contrasts with my focus on the medium-term. Their neglect of the medium term misleads them about the role and relevance of money growth. For every cyclical downturn from the 1920s through the 1980s, my history compares real base growth to the real long-term interest rate using the expected inflation rate instead of the actual rate after the expected rate became available. Charts 2 and 3 show two of the comparisons. In the 1953-54 cycle, real base growth falls until just before the cycle trough in May 1954, then it rises. The real interest rate falls during the decline and rises during the recovery, a pro-cyclical movement that misleads. Real base growth falls again in the months before the cyclical peak in August 1957. Real interest rates fall also. According to base growth, monetary policy tightened. Real interest rates eased.
Charts 2 and 3 here
Real base growth falls before cyclical troughs and rises before the peaks in every cycle from the 1920s to the 1980s. Real interest rate shows much less consistency. The Federal Reserve never made use of this information at least in part because of its short-term focus and its neglect of the importance of money growth. Muth (1960) developed an analysis of permanent and transitory disturbances. Economic life has many disturbances of both kinds. Some recent examples of permanent changes include the end of the Soviet Union, the Russian default, failure of Long-Term Capital, and the decline in housing prices. Neither Federal Reserve models nor the financial markets recognize that some changes persist; they are permanent changes in the environment. Existing risk models misstate risk.
3 This has created large errors at times. The Federal Reserves' near-term, short focus contributes to this error. Permanent changes appear in the "fat tails" of distributions.
The Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers introduced two major errors. First, they claimed that our market economy generated inflation before it reached full employment. The
Council proposed and implemented price and wage guidelines to prevent what it considered excessive wage and price increases. No one explained, or even discussed, how control of a small subset of individual prices could prevent persistent changes in the rate of price change. This same error was central to Arthur Burns' plea for price guidelines and later President Nixon's controls. The same error re-emerged in the Carter presidency. No one asked why the money the public saved because some prices were controlled would not be spent on something else, or discussed why changing a few relative prices could not prevent inflation -the rate of change of a broad index.
Proponents of guide posts and controls often claimed that corporations and labor unions exploited their monopoly power to raise prices. Burns used this reasoning repeatedly. He never explained why this power resulted in a maintained rate of price increase (inflation) and not a onetime increase in price level or a change in relative prices that exploited the monopoly power.
The confusion of price level, or relative price changes, and inflation -a maintained rate of change -was present also in the Federal Reserve's response to the oil price increases in 1973 and 1979. These were large relative price changes. Reported price index numbers rose for a time but returned to their underlying rate of increase if policy remained unchanged.
Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve, at the time, did not distinguish between inflation and a relative price change, so it attempted to reverse the increase. This added to the social cost. By 2008, the Federal Reserve had learned to make the distinction, so it did not repeat the error and it began to exclude volatile relative price changes from its measure of "core inflation."
Reliance of the Phillips curve as a model of inflation was the second major problem introduced by the Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers. One error was a belief that policy could gain a permanent reduction in the unemployment rate by choosing to accept more inflation. Friedman (1968) effects. If the effects of an overdone restriction begin sooner or later to be overtly evident, and are unfortunate, as I think they will be, we should not be able to plead ignorance. … Let me also suggest, as a sort of aside, that the period we are in is one that illustrates the grave dangers of the free-reserve, net-borrowed reserve concept as a guide to policy." (ibid., 20) (Quoted in Meltzer, 2010, 204) Soon after the economy was in recession. In the 1970s, Darryl Francis warned about money growth frequently. His warnings, like Bryan's were ignored. In the 1970s, some FOMC members recognized that inflation was a monetary problem. They would not control money either because disinflation caused a temporary increase in unemployment or, more often, because monetary control required larger variation in market interest rates than they were willing to accept. The FOMC seems more concerned with protecting banks from interest rate fluctuations than in protecting the public from inflation.
Short-term market movements dominated Martin's concerns and governed his actions.
He was correct that monetary economics could not predict the daily or weekly market movements that concerned him. But as Bryan and others pointed out at times, inflation would not be controlled using his procedures. Although Martin opposed inflation and made many speeches warning about the consequences of sustained inflation, the inflation rate reached 6 percent in the last year of his service.
One of the persistent errors was a consequence of the money market focus. Governor Sherman Maisel pointed out in 1970 that when he became a member of the Board, he received hundreds of pages of material. None explained how the Federal Reserve made decisions. There was no written record and no agreement among the participants. More surprising to me is that there was never a discussion of the principles guiding monetary policy and no effort to agree on a broad framework. In fact, the Martin FOMC did not use forecasts until the mid-1960s. The "Riefler rule" forbade forecasting.
Later, the Board's staff developed an econometric model and several Reserve banks also had models. FOMC members received forecasts in advance of each meeting, but the minutes suggest that members did not rely on or agree to the staff forecast and, as mentioned earlier, Paul
Volcker and Alan Greenspan did not find the staffs' forecasts useful.
Let me mention a few additional errors that appear frequently. The minutes rarely distinguish between real and nominal exchange rates and real and nominal interest rates.
Members considered an 8 percent federal funds rate high even as inflation rose to 8 percent. The forecasting staff prepared forecasts without any consideration of monetary policy. James Pierce, a deputy research director pointed that out, but procedures did not change. The FOMC followed an "even keel" policy of holding interest rates unchanged for weeks surrounding a Treasury Poole, noted that this procedure gave an inflationary bias to the monetary aggregates, but the FOMC did not change.
Brief Summary of 1951-86 Actions
In the book, the history of the years 1951-86 covers nearly 1400 pages. All that I can do here is discuss a few highlights. I concentrate on inflation. Friedman's (1968) presidential address as theoretically correct but practically irrelevant. He expected inflation to decline along the same Phillips curve on which it rose. He recognized later that that didn't happen.
The economists on President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers accepted
Friedman's analysis and believed that excessive money growth was the principal cause of inflation. However, they responded to political pressures to reduce the unemployment rate first and reduce inflation later. Most often, they urged the Federal Reserve to increase money growth.
President Kennedy expressed concern about the loss of gold and, at one point, threatened to take U.S. troops out of Europe to stop French and German gold purchases. French President deGaulle believed it was an empty threat. France continued to buy gold from the U.S. stock.
Germany stopped.
The Johnson administration used controls to prevent payments crises from spreading. By 1968, only governments and central banks could buy gold from the U.S. stock, and they were discouraged from buying. By the end of Martin's term in 1970, inflation reached 6 percent and the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was close to its end. Volcker took office in August 1979. In September, the Board raised the discount rate on a 4 to 3 rate. Volcker thought the market would interpret the increase as evidence of his intentions. Instead, many read the 4 to 3 vote as a sign of dissension and weakness. Volcker learned that incremental changes were not likely to work.
In early October, the FOMC unanimously agreed to control growth of bank reserves. The decision reduced the FOMC's responsibility for the rise in interest rates. In practice, they restricted changes in interest rates at times, but they did not prevent the funds rates from reaching 20 percent.
Reserve control was imperfect and erratic at times. Banks borrowed reserves at rates often far below the federal funds rate. Control imperfections may have prolonged the disinflationary period. Three other changes worked to make the anti-inflation policy succeed. Chart 5 suggests that forecast errors for real GDP are often large, often much larger than differences between Federal Reserve and market consensus forecasts. Chart 7 shows forecast errors for real GDP growth from 1971 to 1999. Large errors and persistent errors show how difficult it is to forecast quarterly changes.
Chart 7 here
The puzzle is that the Federal Reserve gives so much attention to the near-term and so little to longer-term consequences. They know, as we all should know, that economics is not the science that gives accurate near-term forecasts of inflation and output growth. There is no such science. Further, even if near-term forecasts improved greatly there is good reason to believe that policy changes would not have much near-term effect.
A related part of the puzzle is that policy can have a predictable effect on medium-term inflation. Several countries have adopted inflation targets that aim at inflation 2 or 3 years ahead. The U.S. Congress has not accepted an inflation target, and the Federal Reserve has not adopted one.
The Future
Currently, the Federal Reserve faces two major problems. The government has announced that it plans $9 trillion dollars of budget deficits over the next decade. They do not tell us how they propose to finance the deficits or how they might reduce them. The Federal
Reserve increased bank reserves by more than $1 trillion, from $800 billion to $2.2 trillion after the Lehman failure in 2008. At the time I write measured excess reserves are $1 trillion. It is disingenuous and wrong to tell the public that most of the problem will be handled by paying interest on bank reserves or selling non-marketable securities. How high do they believe the interest rate must rise to get banks to hold hundreds of billions of reserves after loan demand increases. And does the staff model recognize that banks see the lending rate, not the funds rate, as the relevant opportunity cost? To plan for the future, the public should be told how these enormous deficits will be financed and how excess reserves will be reduced. History does not record any example of countries that faced high money growth, large and growing budget deficits and a depreciating currency that escaped inflation. The only examples to the contrary are countries that adopted strong disinflationary fiscal and monetary policies. The United States has not begun to make the changes that will be needed. This is another example of lexicographic ordering and a short-term focus. The Russian default, housing price declines, failure of Long-Term Capital and many other persistent changes produced major market disturbances. We cannot expect to predict permanent changes, but we can improve the ability to recognize them when they occur.
Finally, I repeat my earlier proposal to increase both price and exchange rate stability.
We know that no country acting alone can provide both, but both are desirable. My proposal calls for agreement by the major currency providers -the United States, the European Central Bank, Japan and China, if it develops a less restricted monetary system. The countries would agree to maintain inflation between zero and 2 percent. Any country that fixed its currency to the low inflation currencies would import low inflation and maintain a fixed exchange rate. The
United States, Japan, and the ECB would benefit from fixed exchange rates and low inflation in countries that fix. Countries that chose to float their currency could do so, but they would lose the public benefit. Real exchange rates would remain flexible.
Conclusion
In its 96 year history, the Federal Reserve has adapted to extraordinary changes in political and monetary arrangements. Its record, however, is not without failures and errors.
Reforms should be made, to reduce errors. Discretion should be limited by a rule or quasi-rule, preferably one that is compatible with low inflation policies abroad. Congress and the Federal Reserve should agree on a rule for the lender-of-last-resort and follow it.
The most important single change in policymaking would change the FOMC's focus from very near-term events to increased attention to longer-term consequences of its actions. In its long history, there are few periods of sustained growth and low inflation. The years of the great moderation are an exception. At that time, the Federal Reserve acted as if it followed a Taylor rule. More attention to longer-term consequences embedded in a quasi-rule like the Taylor rule is a start. Once the FOMC abandons excessive attention to near-term events, it will find that money growth is an imperfect but useful guide on which to rely.
Through most of its history, the Federal Reserve followed lexicographic ordering with unemployment its principal concern. When it shifted concern to inflation, unemployment rose.
Concern shifted back to unemployment. In 1980-82, disinflation was its main concern.
Currently, it is back to concentrating on reducing the unemployment rate. Instead of following its dual mandate, it takes one objective at a time. The result in the 1970s was that both unemployment and inflation rose on average. And in the 1980s both declined.
The Feds massive intervention to rescue the large banks and respond to rising unemployment is not matched by an effective strategy to prevent inflation. Although Chairman
Bernanke told us repeatedly that excess reserves would decline when banks and others repaid their short-term debt, it didn't happen. Instead the Fed increased mortgage holdings. These actions introduce large amounts of long-term, illiquid assets onto the Fed's balance sheet.
Nothing like this has ever occurred. It abrogates independence by allocating credit to help the housing industry and by mixing credit policy and monetary policy. Also, it makes it more difficult to reduce the massive volume of excess reserves. Who will buy the massive holding of illiquid mortgages?
Classical economists understood that when real cash balances rise above the public's desired holdings, the public buys assets and/or output. When real balances fall below desired levels, the public accumulates balances and prices fall until desired real balances are reached.
The annual demand for base money and money is sufficiently stable to make this classical or neo-classical proposition useful, more useful I expect that many of the propositions that are in vogue.
Most of the economic models used in the academic literature and at the Federal Reserve do not include asset prices and credit markets. One exception that reflects the emphasis on asset markets as well as output and prices is in the series of papers that I did with Karl Brunner. Finally, the recurring issue of the role of bank presidents is again active. In the past
Congress has not changed their role. That is the right decision, I believe. It retains the broad influence brought by the presidents, representing regional as well as national interests. In the past, the regional banks have proposed important changes. St. Louis pressed for the increased attention to money, real interest rates and inflation that became System policy from 1979 to 1982. Minneapolis has led in the effort to reform the response to bank failures, and all regional banks bring information from business, labor and consumers. And the regional banks are less influenced by political pressures. This valuable role is the heart of President Wilson's compromise that created the Federal Reserve. The compromise should be retained.
